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the court on the other hand felt that they should not disturb these
findings of fact made in reference to the foreign law by the trial
judge. One is inevitably led to the conclusion that the foreign law
was characterized by the lex loci delicti.
The second question in relation to the main issue before the
Court was what rule of law applied to the case where the tort was

committed in the State of Maine but the action brought in the Province of Quebec. Fauteux J. relied on the English common law rule
that in such a situation the tort must be actionable in Quebec and
unjustified in Maine where the action arose. The learned judge cited
the authority of McLean v. Pettigrew3 as an application of this principle in the Province of Quebec. Whether this principle is applicable in Quebec has been subject to much criticism by the text
writers and has been the result of frequent litigation. It has
been argued that the English principle does not apply in Quebec
because of Civil Code, Article 6(3), which has been interpreted to
mean that the lex loci delicti applies exclusively in a case of a tort
4
occurring in one state and action taken in another.
Samson v. Holden thus reaffirms the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada on previous occasions that the English
principle operates in Quebec as well as the other Provinces.
J.G.W.

United States of America v. Harden, [1963] S.C.R. 366; 63 D.T.C.
1276; (1963) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 721; (1963) 44 W.W.R. 630.
In this decision, the Supreme Court of Canada speaking through
Cartwright J. restated the well-established principle that one country
does not enforce the revenue laws of another unless there is a specific
agreement to the contrary. It is submitted that this decision extends
the principle so that it now reads that one country will not enforce,
either directly or indirectly, the revenue judgments of another.
The appellant government was attempting to enforce a judgment
of an American district court for the recovery of over $600,000 in
income taxes against the respondent who had since become a resident
of the province of British Columbia. The case was brought to trial
in British Columbia' and an appeal was taken by the appellant to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 2 The Supreme Court of Canada
followed the two preceding courts and dismissed the appellant's claim.
3 [1945] S.C.R. 62.
4 On this subject see P. A. Cr~peau, De La Responsabilitd Civile ExtraContractuefle En Droit International Privd Qudbecois, (1961) 39 Can. Bar

Rev. 3.

1 (1961) 35 W.W.R. 654.
2 (1962) 40 W.W.R. 428.
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The appellants based their claim on three arguments: first, that
although Canada would not recognize a claim for taxes by a foreign
government it would enforce a judgment of a foreign court based
on the claim; secondly, that Canada would enforce a foreign agreement
for valuable consideration to pay an amount in satisfaction of the
claim for taxes; and finally, that the trial judge erred in setting aside
the writ without allowing the action to proceed to trial.
Cartwright, J. who wrote the judgment for the Supreme Court
of Canada held that all the contentions of the appellant were invalid.
The learned judge further held that:
* I . the application of the rule that foreign states cannot directly or
indirectly enforce their tax claims in our courts is not affected by the
taking of a judgment in the foreign state, and that the liability to pay
tax does not become converted into a contractual obligation . . .3
The authority given for these statements is the decision of Lord
Somervell of Harrow in the case of Government of India, Ministry
of Finance (Revenue Division) v. Taylor,4 a decision of the House
of Lords.
It is interesting to note that in the Taylor case (supra) the
appellant was claiming for taxes due, not on the basis of a foreign
judgment, but simply as a creditor in the voluntary liquidation of a
company which was registered in the United Kingdom but which had
previously carried on business in India. Secondly, in the judgments
of both Lord Keith of Avonholm and Lord Somervell of Harrow, heavy
emphasis was placed on the previously unreported decision of Kingsmill Moore J. in the case of Peter Buchanan Ld. and Macharg V.
McVey 5 in the High Court of Justice of Eire.
This latter case, like the Taylor case, involved a direct claim by
the Scottish government against the defendant for taxes due under
the Finance Act of 1943. Kingsmill Moore J. dealt exhaustively with
the applicable law on the enforcement of foreign revenue legislation
and then dismissed the claim of the Scottish revenue authorities. This7
decision was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court of Eire.
In his judgment, Kingsmill Moore J. pointed out that:
Those cases on penalties would seem to establish that it is not the form
,of the action or the nature of the plaintiff that must be considered but
the substance of the right sought to be enforced ... I cannot see why
the same rule should not prevail where it appears that the enforcement
of a right claimed would indirectly involve the execution of the revenue
law of another state...6
It would appear that this concept of the enforceability of foreign
revenue legislation was adopted without reserve by Cartwright J. and
the Supreme Court of Canada in the case under review. However, it
should be remembered that both in the Buchanan case and the Taylor
3 [1963] S.C.R. 366 at p. 371.
4 [1955] A.C. 491 at pp. 514 and 515.
5 Reported as a note in [19552 A.C. 516.
6 bd., at p. 527.
7 Ibid., at p. 530.
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case, the claims sought to be enforced were direct claims by foreign
governments for revenue, whereas in the case under review, the
claim was indirect in the sense that it was based on a foreign judgment.
Viscount Simonds in his decision in the Taylor case pointed
out, in reference to the rule of not recognizing foreign revenue legislation that:
• . . It is possible that the ... [principle] . . . might, if applied without
discrimination, lead to too wide an application of the rule; for as Lord
Tomlin pointed out in In re Vissers there may be cases in which our
courts, although they do not enforce foreign revenue law, are bound to
recognize some of the consequences of that law...9
Cartwright J. obviously preferred to accept the dictum of Kingsmill Moore J. instead of the comments of both Viscount Simonds and
Lord Tomlin because he stated that it was the duty of our courts to
go behind the form of the foreign judgment and determine the substance of the claim on which it is based.' 0
In conclusion, it is submitted that this decision which extends
an old principle should be viewed with caution. It is further submitted
that the reasons for the basic principle itself may be open to question
in the future because the effect of the principle is to permit tax
evasion by those people who are astute enough to flee a jurisdiction
with their property before the revenue officials of that jurisdiction
apprehend them or seize their property. Thus it would appear that
the extension of the principle of not recognizing foreign revenue
judgments, either directly or indirectly, is inconsistent with present
efforts to encourage international co-operation in the field of taxation
in particular and with modern views in the area of conflict of laws
generally.
H.L.E.W.

D.

CONTRACTS

Field v. Zien, [1963] S.C.R. 632.
Field had a business for the sale and distribution of welding supplies, which he sold to Zien. One term of the agreement was that on
closing, the cash, accounts receivable and inventory of the business
would exceed its accounts payable and accrued liabilities by at least
$109,865. At the time of closing, the balance was about $14,000 less
than that amount. Zien after being in possession of the business for
eleven weeks, sued for rescission. This relief was granted at trial and
affirmed on appeal. The defendant Field brought this appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
8 [1928] Ch. 877 at p. 883.
9 Supra, footnote 4 at p. 505.
:o Supra, footnote 3 at p. 372.

